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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

VIRGIL MOORE,

]

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

]
i

FRED C. SCHWENIDMAN, Chief,
Drivers License Services,
State of Utah,

Case No. 870248-CA

]
]
]

Defendant-Respondent. ]
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
petition

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the

and

to reinstate

the driving

privileges

of

the

plaintiff-appellant based upon the fact that the trial court
did not receive into evidence any document which was a sworn
report filed within five days after the date of arrest with the
Division of Driver License Services?
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing the respondent

to question the plaintiff concerning prior DUI arrests?
3.

Did the evidence sustain the Court's finding that

the defendant-respondent had met the burden of proof?
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
Under

§78-2(a)-3, Utah Code Annotated

(effective

December 31, 1987), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction on
the grounds that this case involves an appeal from a final order
of a District Court review of a state agency, the Drivers License

3
Services

Division

of

the Department

of

Public

Safety

for

the

S t a t e of Utah.
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This
Conclusions
S.

Uno a f t e r

of

is

an

appeal

from

the

Law and Order e n t e r e d

Findings

of

by t h e H o n o r a b l e Raymond

t h e h e a r i n g h e l d on March 1 1 , 1 9 8 7 .

In t h a t

t h e D i s t r i c t Court s u s t a i n e d t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e D r i v e r s
Services

Division

of

the

continued

the suspension

p r i v i l e g e s which was f i r s t

of

Department

Fact,

of

Public

e n t e r e d on October 4 ,

License

Safety

the p l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t ' s

order

and

driving

1984.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The plaintiff-appellant submits that this case can
be determined under the statutory provision set forth in
§41-6-44.10, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) (Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
At the hearing on March 11, 1987, the defendantrespondent proceeded to present the evidence and called as his
first witness a Salt Lake City police officer, R.K. Sullivan
(T. 3).
Officer Sullivan testified that on Sunday, August 5,
1984, at approximately 3:28 a.m., he arrested the plaintiffappellant Virgil Moore.

He indicated that he first observed

a vehicle at about 950 Souia State Street traveling southbound
in the outside lane when it suddenly took a drastic dive towards
the curb for no apparent reason.

He indicated that he followed

the vehicle down the roadway noting a slight weaving from side
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to side.

After the vehicle made another sudden movement to avoid

making contact with barricades located at 1200 South State, he
again followed the vehicle out on State Street to 1700 South
where the vehicle made a right-hand turn.

He stated that the

vehicle made a wide turn, crossed over the center line into the
eastbound lanes of travel and was traveling 48 m.p.h. in a 35
m.p.h. zone.
He then pulled over the vehicle and identified Virgil
Moore as being the person in court who was operating the vehicle
on the day in question.

After testifying concerning his

detection of slurred speech and the odor of alcoholic beverage,
he adminstered

the field sobriety tests.

After the field

sobriety tests, he placed Mr. Moore under arrest for driving
under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and he testified
that he requested him to take a chemical test by reading verbatim
the admonition from the DUI Report Form (T. 9). The officer
indicated that Mr. Moore said he would take the test, and the
officer instructed another police officer to transport him to
the Salt Lake County Jail and adminster a test (T. 10).
He later indicated that he was informed by the officer
that the arrested person "had not completed the breath test,"
and so he filled out a report and submitted it to the Drivers
License Division.

The DUI Report Form was not received in

evidence, and the officer indicated that he did sign a DUI Report
Form dated August 5, 1984, in his own handwriting which he swore
to by raising his right hand in front of a notary (T. 10)
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On cross-examination, the report was marked by the
attorney for the plaintiff-appellant as Exhibit 1 but was not
received into evidence.

Officer Sullivan indicated that he had

no personal knowledge of whether or not Mr. Moore did take the
test.
Q
Do y o u r e c a l l r e q u e s t i n g t h e
o f f i c e r t o go a d m i n i s t e r t h e t e s t ?
A

Yes.

Q
Okay.
the report?
A

other

Yes

And do you r e c a l l

filling

out

. . . .

Q
Does that indicate that the arrested
person refused to take the test?
MR. GAITHER: I will object to his conclusions about the document.
THE COURT: Unless there's more foundation,
I think that the objection is sustainable.
MR. HALE: The foundation is he put it down.
Your Honor. Isn't that correct; officer?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that's right.
that on the report.

I listed

On further re-cross examination by counsel for the
plaintiff-appellant, the officer indicated that he had not heard
any statements by Mr. Moore or observed Mr. Moore do any acts
which would cause him to personally reach the conclusion that
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test prior to the time that
he filled out the report (T. 18).

He did indicate that when

Mr. Moore was in his presence, he stated that he would take the
tests.
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At the conclusion of Officer Sullivan's testimony,
the attorney for the plaintiff-appellant made a motion to strike
the entire last line of testimony concerning the information
that Officer Sullivan received from Officer Cracroft about the
alleged refusal to submit to the test as being hearsay.

Counsel

for the plaintiff-appellant indicated that he understood that
the information

was only being offered to show how the

information got into the report, but it was hearsay as far as
witness Sullivan was concerned.

The Court indicated that the

report would not be received until after the testimony of Officer
Cracroft.
The next witness called by the State was David
Cracroft, a police officer for Salt Lake City Police Department
(T. 20). Officer Cracroft indicated that he was requested by
Officer Sullivan to take Mr. Moore to the Salt Lake City Police
Station located in Salt Lake City, Utah, to administer breath
test.

He indicated that he transported him to the place where

the intoxilyzer was located at the entrance to the jail.

He

indicated that he was certified to operate the test, and he went
through the standard procedure of running the intoxilyzer machine
(T. 22). He stated that he put the hose to Mr. Moore's mouth,
and he blew for just a short period, a second, and then quit
blowing (T. 22). The officer .estified that Mr. Moore puffed
his cheeks, blew into the machine for a second and then no more
air went into the machine, the sample light went out, so no air
sample was going in the machine.

The officer indicated that
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he told Mr. Moore to blow until he told him to stop, and he did
not do that.

After which he told him, "Stop faking and blow

into the machine or you could lose your license," (T. 23). He
stated that Mr. Moore indicated to him that he was blowing, but
the officer's conclusion was that he did not get any more air.
At that point he stopped the test.

Officer Cracroft indicated

that he reported back to Officer Sullivan what had occurred
concerning Mr. Moore's alleged conduct (T. 24).
On cross-examination the officer testified that there
was a test record made from the intoxilyzer machine which he
destroyed immediately after the incident.

He indicated that

he never recalibrated the intoxilyzer machine and had no records
in court to show whether or not the machine was functioning
properly at the time the test procedures were being given (T.
28).

He stated that during the testing procedure as well as

the green light that came on concerning the breath sample that
the error light kept coming on.

When asked whether or not the

error light meant more than merely insufficient breath sample,
the officer testified that "in this case it meant there was an
improper

sample, in my opinion.

However, if there is a

malfunction with the machine in any of the steps, the error light
will come on," (T. 29).

He stated that the error light is a

^ed light that comes on during the testing procedure as opposed
to the green light concerning the air sample.

He stated that

normally when the light comes on, you have to shut off the
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machine and turn it back on and start over and recalibrate the
machine^ which he did not do in this case (T. 30).
On re-direct he indicated that he followed a checklist
that is prepared in connection with the intoxilyzer machine but
that he tore it up at the same time that the test card was torn
up.

On recross-examination the officer indicated that the error

light came on about five seconds after the test and that there
was enough time for him to put the tube up, take a short sample,
remind him to blow again and then tell him that if he did not
blow that he could lose his license.

The officer testified that

all of these procedures took place within the span of time of
about five seconds before the error light came on and that it
took place within a matter of "several seconds," (T. 34).
When the witness concluded testifying, the defendantrespondent rested.

Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant made

a motion at that time to dismiss citing §41-6-44.10, U.C.A.
(1953, as amended), on the grounds that there was no evidence
of a sworn report admitted into evidence; that the officer did
not have any personal knowledge at the time the alleged report
was completed; and that the Court did not have jurisdiction
because there was no showing that the Driver License Division
had jurisdiction initially to take the action to suspend the
petitioner's driving privileges (T. 36). The plaintiff-appellant
also made a motion to dismiss based upon the fact that no records
concerning the intoxilyzer machine were introduced to show a
foundation as to whether or not the machine was working correctly
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or incorrectly in light of the testimony that an error light
came on during the procedure.

The Court denied the motion to

dismiss (T„ 41).
The plaintiff-appellant, Virgil Moore, then took the
stand and testified that he was arrested on the day in question
for driving under the influence.

Mr. Moore indicated that he

was told that he was not blowing into the machine but that he
did blow into the machine at the time in question.
On cross-examination, the Court, over objection of
counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, allowed the State to ask
a question as to whether or not Mr. Moore had ever had a prior
DUI arrest.

The Court overruled the objection and counsel for

the defendant-respondent was able to ask whether or not on April
16, 1983, he had been previously requested to take a similar
test (T. 4 9 ) .

Over another objection by counsel for the

plaintiff-appellant, the attorney for the defendant-respondent
was allowed to ask whether or not the officer in the previous
arrest had contended that he was not blowing properly into the
machine.

Mr. Moore indicated that the officer had previously

made that contention (T. 51).
Thereafter, the plaintiff-appellant rested and the
Court entered an order denying the petition and finding that
there had been a refusal by the plaintiff-appellant (T. 53).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
petition

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the

and to reinstate the driving privileges of the
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plaintiff-appellant based upon the fact that the trial court
did not receive into evidence any document which was a sworn
report filed within five days after the date of arrest with the
Division of Driver License Services?
2.

Did the trial court err in allowing the respondent

to question the plaintiff concerning prior DUI arrests?
3.

Did the evidence sustain the Court's finding that

the defendant-respondent had met the burden of proof?
ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
THE PETITION AND TO REINSTATE THE DRIVING
PRIVILEGES OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT BASED
UPON THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
RECEIVE INTO EVIDENCE ANY DOCUMENT WHICH
WAS A SWORN REPORT FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS
AFTER THE DATE OF ARREST WITH THE DIVISION
OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES.
The trial court did not have any evidence in this
matter that the document which was referred to during the
evidence as a report was ever submitted to the Driver License
Division within five days after the arrest.

The statute clearly

requires that the report shall be submitted within five days
from the date of the arrest.

The defendant-respondent argued

that the report was not jurisdictional and that the court did
not need to receive the report because the matter was a trial
de novo and sufficient oral testimony was introduced without
the necessity for any documentation.
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In the case of H e l s t e n v. Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509
(Utah,

1 9 8 3 ) , t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t in Utah an

officer's

r e p o r t t h a t i n i t i a t e s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e revocation

p r o c e e d i n g s i s a mandatory requirement of the s t a t u t e s .
case the Court found t h a t t h e o f f i c e r ' s
in

the

In t h a t

r e p o r t was not signed

p r e s e n c e of a n o t a r y and was n o t a sworn

report.

T h e r e f o r e , t h e Court r u l e d t h a t the document f a i l e d to s a t i s f y
t h e s t a t u t o r y requirement of §41-6-44.10, U.C.A., and the Driver
License Division

r e v o c a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g s based t h e r e o n were

i n v a l i d and the r e v o c a t i o n of the p e r s o n ' s d r i v i n g p r i v i l e g e s
was a legal n u l l i t y .
In t h e Utah d e c i s i o n of H e 1 s t e n ,

t h e Court c i t e d

t h e Oregon case of Blackburn v. Motor Vehicles Division, Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n ,

576 P. 2d 1267 (Ct. App . O r e . , 1 9 7 8 ) .

In t h e Blackburn d e c i s i o n , t h e Oregon c o u r t s t a t e d t h a t
entire

process

toward

suspension

for

the

refusal

to take a

breathalyzer t e s t i s i n i t i a t e d by the "sworn r e p o r t . "

The Oregon

c o u r t s a i d t h a t w i t h o u t t h i s r e p o r t the Oregon Motor V e h i c l e
D i v i s i o n had no a u t h o r i t y t o commence t h e suspension p r o c e s s .
The Court s a i d the sworn r e p o r t i s in essence the basis of the
D i v i s i o n ' s a u t h o r i t y to c o n s i d e r s u s p e n s i o n .
t h a t the sworn report i s a j u r i s d i c t i o n a l

The Court held

requirement.

In Blackburn the Court went on to s t a t e t h a t i t would
be u n n e c e s s a r y for the Court in t h e appeal to define the outer
l i m i t s of the scope of the de novo review in the lower

court

of the D i v i s i o n ' s s u s p e n s i o n order because of the i r r e g u l a r i t y
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of the jurisdictional document.

In the case of Colman v.

Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court
followed the decision in Helsten and held that the sworn report
is required to show the validity of the revocation proceedings
and that if the report is not sworn, the subsequent proceedings
would be void.

In Colman they found that the revocation

proceedings were a legal nullity because the officer did not
follow the essential requirements to constitute the taking of
an oath as required by the statute.
In matters where the District Court jurisdiction is
based upon review of the action of an agency, even if the matter
is on trial for a de novo review, the jurisdiction of the
District Court is based upon whether or not the agency had
subject matter jurisdiction.

Berry v. Arizona State Land

Department, 651 P.2d 853 (Ariz., 1982)

The District Court in

an appeal de novo has only the subject matter jurisdiction which
could be asserted in the administrative hearing from which the
appeal was taken.

It is clear under the statute that if the

report was not a sworn report or was not submitted within five
days, the Driver License Division would not have jurisdiction
to take away the plaintiff-appellant's driving privileges;
therefore, the District Court would not have the jurisdiction
to proceed over the subject matter at issue.
In addition at the hearing before Judge Uno and in
this appeal, the evidence did not support the conclusion reached
by the trial court that a sworn report was submitted to the
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Drivers License Division.

The plaintiff-appellant submits that

the testimony indicated that the officer filled out a document
entitled

"DUI Report Form."

On direct the officer merely

indicated that he signed the DUI Report Form and submitted the
DUI Report Form to the Driver License Division (T. 10).

The

evidence is completely absent that the document which the officer
claims was submitted to the Driver License Division was more
than a DUI Report Form and consisted of a "sworn report" as
required by the statute.

Later during the trial, on redirect

examination, the attorney for the defendant-respondent attempted
to elicit from the witness the conclusions contained in the
documents

(T. 17).

The Court sustained an objection to the

officer testifying about the conclusions contained in the
document.

Further questioning revealed that the last sentence

of the report indicated that the officer may have signed a
document which stated that the subject violated §41-6-44, U.C.A.,
which is the substantive provision for driving under the
influence and is not related to the implied consent law (T. 17).
Therefore,

the District Court did not have any

sufficient competent evidence to make a ruling that a sworn
report was ever submitted to the Driver License Division.
This Court should interpret the provision requiring
thav a sworn report be submitted within five days as jurisdictional as is clearly contemplated by the statute.

There are

many policy reasons for the Legislature enacting such a
requirement, one of which being that these matters should be
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done in a prompt and expeditious fashion.

If that requirement

is not construed as being mandatory, then there could be
instances where an officer or the Driver License Division does
not act on a sworn report for months or years after the reported
incident takes place.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff-appellant
requests that the Court find that the State of Utah did not meet
their burden of proof in presenting all of the jurisdictional
facts necessary before the District Court in opposition to the
petition to have his driver's license reinstated.

As a result

of not meeting the burden of proof, the Court should have granted
the petition reinstating the plaintiff's driving privileges.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE RESPONDENT
TO QUESTION THE PLAINTIFF CONCERNING PRIOR
DUI ARRESTS.
As referenced in the Statement of Facts, the Court
allowed the respondent's attorney to ask Mr. Moore if he had
ever been arrested for a DUI.

After overruling the objection

for relevancy, the Court allowed the attorney for the respondent
to ask Mr. Moore as to whether or not the officer in the prior
case contended that he was not blowing properly (T. 51). Over
objection by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Moore was required to
answer the question that the officer had previously contended
that he had not blown properly into the machine.

Counsel for

the plaintiff then made a motion to strike the entire line of
questioning based upon the fact that it was inadmissible hearsay
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without

foundation,

evidence

arguing

t o be r e c e i v e d /

that

if

t h e Court a l l o w e d

the

t h e C o u r t would have t o base

its

d e c i s i o n on i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e .

The Court d e n i e d

the motion to s t r i k e the e v i d e n c e .
In t h i s c a s e t h e Court may have p o s s i b l y been c o r r e c t
i n r u l i n g t h a t Mr. Moore's p r i o r knowledge of t h e
m a c h i n e may h a v e b e e n r e l e v a n t
However,

t o do t h i s

to

the c i v i l

intoxilyzer

proceedings.

t h e Court would have to find that

the

r e l e v a n c e outweighed t h e undue prejudice of evidence concerning
his prior

acts

of

misconduct.

Notwithstanding the

limited

r e l e v a n c e of t h i s l i n e of q u e s t i o n i n g , i t was c l e a r l y error to
require

Mr. Moore t o e i t h e r

admit or deny t h e

d e c l a r a t i o n s made by the a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r

out-of-court

in h i s prior c a s e .

Those d e c l a r a t i o n s were not i n t r o d u c e d by means of any w r i t t e n
or e v i d e n t i a r y

documents

but merely in t h e form of

hearsay

e v i d e n c e t o which Mr. Moore was required by the Court to e i t h e r
agree

or d i s a g r e e w i t h as far as the c o n c l u s i o n s of

another

party.
The q u e s t i o n s of Mr. Moore were c l e a r l y

inappropriate

under the Rules 403, 404 and 802, Utah Rules of Evidence.
Ill

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUSTAIN THE COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD
MET THE BURDEN OF PROOF.
In the case of Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 778
(Utah, 1986), the Supreme Court indicated that a district court
must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the
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petitioner's
provisions

license

is subject

of this chapter.

to revocation

under

the

In that case the Supreme Court

indicated that it would give deference to the trial court's view
of the evidence unless the trial court has misapplied principles
of law or its findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence.
Plaintiff-appellant submits that the findings of the
court here are clearly against the evidence and that the evidence
did not support

the conclusions reached by the court.

The

officer that filled out the DUI Report Form, which the Court
concluded

constituted

a sworn

report

of refusal, only had

personal knowledge that Mr. Moore consented to take the test.
When Officer

Sullivan

asked Mr. Moore to take the test, he

indicated that he would take the test.
The other officer testified as to two areas which th*e
plaintiff-appellant

submits are

inconsistent.

First, he

testified that in his opinion, Mr. Moore was not blowing into
the machine.

However, he later testified that the red error

light was coming on and that from the time he first asked Mr.
Moore to blow into the machine until the error light came on,
a period of time of only five seconds had elapsed.
testified

The officer

that the machine had two lights upon which he was

basing h^s conclusions—the green light for the air sample and
the red error light.

The officer was not an expert familiar

with the machine and there was not evidence introduced to show
whether or not the machine was malfunctioning.
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In light of these inconsistent facts, the plaintiffappellant submits that the Court should find that the trial court
should have required sufficient documentation before giving
weight to the testimony of the officer to the extent that the
Court sustained the Driver License Division's ruling.

There

was no evidence of any check record or the checklist which the
officer said that he prepared and tore up after he believed that
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test.

Nor was there any

evidence from any of the experts who regularly maintained the
machine as to whether or not the machine was malfunctioning on
the time and date in question.
In addition, the plaintiff-appellant requests the Court
to review carefully page 34 of the transcript.

In that portion

of the transcript, the officer testified that in the space of
several seconds, there was enough time for him to put the tube
up again to the plaintiff's mouth, require him to take a short
sample, remind him to blow again into the air tube and then tell
him that if he did not blow, he could lose him license.

After

that, the red error light came on and the officer deemed that
Mr. Moore had refused to take the test.
Therefore, a review

of the facts in the brief

transcript of the hearing will indicate that the trial court
made findings which are clearly against the weight of the
evidence and that much of the evidence which the trial court
gave great weight should not even have been admitted because
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of the lack of foundation concerning the scientific equipment
used for breath testing.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing brief/ the plaintiffappellant requests that the Court enter an order finding that
the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff-appellant's motion
made at the close of the case on direct by the defendantrespondent to grant the relief requested in the petition and
enter an order remanding this matter back to the District Court
for reinstatement of the plaintiff-appellant's driving privileges
in relation to the incident at issue in this case
Dated this

cL

day of September,

IDALL
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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to Bruce M. Hale, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, on this
1987.

day of September,

ADDENDUM A

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drug —
Refusal to allow — Warning, report, revocation of license — Court
action on revocation — Person incapable of refusal — Results of test
available — Who may give test — Evidence, (a) Any person operating
a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose
of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe such
person to have been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol
and any drug. A peace officer shall determine which of the aforesaid tests
shall be administered.
No person, who has been requested pursuant to this section to submit
to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the
right to select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability
of a peace officer to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense
to taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to
submit to the requested test or tests.
(b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been
requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical
tests provided for in subsection (a) of this section and refuses to submit
to such chemical test or tests, such person shall be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests
can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor vehicle. Following
this warning, unless such person immediately requests the chemical test
or tests as offered by a peace officer be administered, no test shall be given
and a peace officer shall submit a sworn report that he had grounds to
believe the arrested person had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug
or combination of alcohol and any drug and that the person had refused
to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth in subsection (a) of this
section. Within 20 days after receiving a sworn report from a peace officer
to the effect that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the
department shall notify such person of a hearing before the department.
If at said hearing the department determines that the person was granted
the right to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department
as required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his
license or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by
the department under the provisions of this section shall have the right
to file a petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in
the district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such
court is hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the
matter for trial de novo upon 10-days' written notice to the department
and thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case
and to determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation
under the provisions of this act.

(c) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in
subsection (a) of this section, and the test or tests may be administered
whether such person has been arrested or not.
(d) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of such
test or tests shall be made available to him.
(e) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19), acting at the request of a peace officer
can withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug
content therein. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine
or breath specimen. Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or
person authorized under subsection 26-1-30 (19) who, at the direction of
a peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test
is administered according to standard medical practice.
(f) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician
of his own choosing administer a chemical test in addition to the test or
tests administered at the direction of a peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such additional test shall not affect admissability of the
results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a peace officer, nor
preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the direction of a peace
officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical
test or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult
an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney,
physician or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or
tests under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be
admissible in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed while the person was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.

